Questions about current and prior religious adherence from the International Social Survey Program and the World Values Survey allow us to calculate country-level religious-conversion rates for 40 countries. These conversion rates apply to religious adherence classified into eight major types. In a theoretical model based on rational individual choice, the frequency of religious conversion depends on factors that influence the cost of switching and the cost of having the "wrong" religion. Empirical findings for a panel of countries accord with several hypotheses: religious-conversion rates are positively related to religious pluralism, gauged by adherence shares; negatively related to government restrictions on religious conversion; positively related to levels of education; and negatively related to a history of Communism. Conversion rates are not much related to per capita GDP, the presence of state religion, and the extent of religiosity. Effects from the type of religious adherence are minor, except for a negative effect from Muslim adherence.
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Empirical investigations of the determinants of religious conversion have typically focused on persons within a single country, most often the United States. In the present study, we use survey questions from the International Social Survey Program and the World Values Survey to assess determinants of religious-conversion rates across a broad group of countries.
The conceptual antecedents for our study begin with Lofland and Skonovd (1981) , who developed a descriptive typology of religious conversion. Their work demonstrated that conversion takes place within an historical-cultural context in which geographical location was often important. Gartrell and Shannon (1985, p. 32) extended the framework by observing that "conversion hinges on actors' perceptions of the expected rewards of converting relative to not converting." Thus, they applied a rationalchoice approach to the descriptive setting of Lofland and Skonovd (1981) .
This study follows the spirit of Gartrell and Shannon (1985) by analyzing religious conversion as an individual's decision about whether and when to switch.
Conversion restrictions imposed by governments and organized religions continue to apply in some places, and these constraints affect personal choices. However, we can still analyze conversion decisions in terms of the benefits and costs as perceived by individuals. Therefore, we use a rational-choice framework at the individual level to make predictions about the determinants of religious-conversion rates in our countrylevel data.
The prior theoretical work that relates most closely to our framework is the niche model of religion developed by Finke (2000, 2002) . In their setting, an ideal pluralistic religion market consists of niches that cover the full range of individuals' or stricter religion. This process features an indirect form of conversion across generations that may not show up in conversion data-when the children remain in the religion in which they were raised.
Since most empirical studies apply to a single country over a relatively short period, the results cannot be used to assess the effects of country-wide policies and characteristics, such as regulation of the religion market, political regimes such as Communism, and the extent of religious pluralism at the country level.
1 Our panel of 40 countries fills this void by examining effects on religious-conversion rates from these kinds of country-level policies and characteristics.
Section I constructs a theoretical model based on individual choice to assess determinants of religious-conversion rates at the country level. Section II discusses our procedures for using international survey data from the International Social Survey
Program (ISSP 1991 and 1998) and the World Values Survey (WVS 2001) to estimate country-level religious-conversion rates. Section III describes the setup of our empirical analysis. Section IV presents empirical findings on religious-conversion rates at the 1 The only cross-country analysis of religious conversion that we know of is Duke, Johnson, and Duke (1993) . This study uses time series on religious adherence from Barrett (1982) to construct estimates of country-level religious-conversion rates. The problem is that changes over time in a country's stock of adherents to various religions reflect demographic factors (births, deaths, and international migration by type of religion), as well as net changes from religious conversion. It is not possible to use the Barrett data on religious adherence to get reasonable estimates of gross flows due to religious conversion. country level. Section V discusses specification issues and robustness. Section VI has summary observations.
I. Theoretical Framework
This section constructs a simple theoretical model to guide the empirical analysis.
Our theory focuses on individual choices on whether to switch from one available religion to another. Then we use this individual analysis to generate hypotheses about the determinants of religious conversion at the country level. That is, our macro-level framework, applied at the country level, is an aggregation of our micro-level reasoning.
Suppose that m types of religions exist in a country. If the religions can be ordered by a single characteristic, such as strictness, we can array the types along a line at positions z 1 , …, z m , one of which can represent no religion. Differences between religions are then represented by horizontal distances. Alternatively, the types could be arranged around a circle. In this case, the arc-distances measure differences between religions, but there is no sense in which any particular variety exhibits the lowest or highest amount of something like strictness. (We can also generalize to allow for multiple characteristics of religions.)
Assume that individual j is "born" (corresponding, perhaps, to the end of dependent childhood at age 16) with religious adherence of type x j , corresponding to one of the z i . Let (x j )* represent person j's ideal religion at a point in time. The location of this ideal type depends on the benefits that person j perceives from belonging to alternative religions-these benefits depend on theology and strictness but can also
involve the "quality" of religious services, social ties offered by a congregation, and so on. Because religious preferences are shaped by family and neighborhood upbringing during childhood, x j will typically be close to person j's perceived ideal, (x j )*, at "birth." 2 However, religious preferences, (x j )*, can change over time. We assume that they evolve randomly, following a process with no systematic trend. The variance of this process is important for determining the frequency of religious conversion, but we assume in applications that this variance is the same across time and space. Given the variance, the optimally determined frequency of religious switching depends on two factors: the cost of switching and the cost of allowing x j to deviate from (x j )*. A higher switching cost generates a lower frequency of conversion, whereas a larger cost of deviation results in a higher frequency of conversion.
In the simplest setting, the cost of changing religion for person j is the lump-sum amount γ j , independently of which pair of religions enters into the change. More realistically, this cost would depend on which religions apply. For example, in terms of belief systems, switching to a neighboring religion will typically be easier than moving to a faraway religion-a Methodist would likely find it easier to shift to an Evangelical faith or even Judaism or Islam, rather than becoming a Buddhist or Hindu (see Stark and Finke [2000, pp. 123-24] ). Moreover, some religions have higher or lower costs for anyone to enter or leave. In any case, the cost γ j depends on individual and country-wide variables.
One determinant of the switching cost, γ j , at the individual level is education.
More educated people likely find it easier to change religions because they are better at learning and adjusting to new ways of thinking. The better educated tend also to have 2 Stark and Finke (2000, p. 119) One influence of the switching cost, γ j , at the country level is governmental regulatory policy. For example, legal or religious restrictions on conversion raise γ j for all persons j.
The cost of allowing x j to deviate from (x j )* depends on the location of other available religions. For example, if x j is a given distance from (x j )*, the benefit from switching will be greater the closer an alternative religion, one of the z i , to (x j )*. The suitability of alternative religions to the preferences of the typical individual tends to be greater the higher the density of the available religions in a country. The idea, as in
Gruber (2005), is that the greater the concentration of the nearby population in a particular religion, the easier it is for potential members to participate in that religion (because the local area can support the appropriate churches, schools, neighborhood groups, etc.). Thus, if a Methodist would like to become Muslim, but one's locality has only Methodists and Catholics, the benefit from switching is smaller than it would be if the Muslim faith had a local presence. The general point is that, the more pluralistic the 3 Our results on education turn out to support Lehrer (1998, pp. 256-57; , who found that higher levels of educational attainment for exclusivist Protestants raised the probability of marriage outside their faith. Sherkat's findings (2004, p. 618) 
accord with
Lehrer's in that higher levels of educational attainment correlate with higher rates of intermarriage, particularly for women. Sherkat (p. 620) also reports that higher levels of educational attainment for women are correlated with distance of intermarriage; that is, better educated women tend to look geographically farther away for a satisfactory mate. religion market, the higher the typical benefit from making a switch-or, equivalently, the higher the cost of allowing one's current religion, x j , to deviate from (x j )*.
The available religions in a country need not be fixed over time. For example, the rise of Evangelicalism in many places made it less costly for persons to belong to that faith. In the model, we could represent this change by introducing at a point in time a shift to a more pluralistic religion market. This kind of change would induce a large amount of religious conversion as a temporary response to the market innovation.
Formally, we predict that religious conversion depends not only on the current level of religious pluralism but also on past changes in the extent of this pluralism.
The cost of deviation from one's ideal religion depends on how important formal religion is overall. That is, for given locations of available religions, the cost of a deviation of x j from (x j )* will be greater the more important formal religion is to people.
For example, our sample of 40 countries includes 14 that were formerly Communist (but none that were Communist at the time of the surveys). Communist governments sought to diminish the overall value attached to religious participation and beliefs (see Froese and Pfaff [2001] ). To the extent that this political influence remains effective after the demise of Communism, the value of religion would be smaller and the cost of deviations of x j from (x j )* would be lower.
In contrast, education has been argued to raise the benefits of religion through its social-networking role (Glaeser and Sacerdote [2008] ). This argument suggests that more education would multiply the benefit received from the social networks offered by all religions. This multiplication means that more education raises the cost of a given deviation of x j from (x j )*. These models feature two forms of costs: fixed (and possibly also variable) costs for adjusting the level of inventories and costs from allowing the inventory level to deviate from its ideal value. Optimal behavior entails letting the stock of inventory drift (reflecting the level of sales) until the stock deviates from the ideal level by enough-by some critical gap-to warrant a discrete adjustment. By analogy, an individual who optimizes over choices of religious affiliation would allow (x j )* to evolve to some extent away from x j . However, a sufficient deviation triggers the payment of the adjustment cost, γ j , and the choice of a new religion, x j , that is closer than the former one to the current (x j )*. When we apply this micro-level reasoning to average behavior in a population, we get that the frequency of change in religious affiliation will be greater the lower the typical cost of adjustment, γ j , and the higher the typical cost of deviations of x j from (x j )*.
Our empirical analysis gauges the frequency of religious change at the country level by the fraction of the adhering population that undergoes a religious conversion by age 30. The model predicts that this religious-conversion rate will be higher if:
• a country has a higher level of religious pluralism,
• a country shifted recently toward greater religious pluralism,
• a country lacks legal and religious restrictions on conversion,
• a country lacks a history of Communism, and
• a country has higher average educational attainment.
In contrast,
• the level of real per capita GDP has an ambiguous effect on the conversion rate.
We can also use the model to evaluate the effects from an increase in the variance of the religious-preference shock. This change raises the frequency of conversion for a given critical gap (the deviation between actual and ideal type of religion that generates a switch). However, a higher variance also motivates an increase in the size of the critical gap, thereby reducing the frequency of conversion. Typically, this second effect only partially offsets the first, so that a larger variance leads, on net, to a higher frequency of conversion. This result would add additional hypotheses to our list if we could identify variables that influence the variance of the religious-preference shock. However, we
have not made progress in this direction. 4 We can also apply the model to Olson's (2008) Lehrer (1998) , taking account of the costs of spouses having different religions. For present purposes, an important point is that the incorporation of intermarriage leaves intact the predictions already derived for the determinants of religious conversion.
II. Survey Measures of Religious Conversion
The present analysis assesses determinants of religious conversion across a broad sample of countries. We use the waves on religion from the International Social Survey predicted number of conversions out or in, when expressed as a ratio to the size of religion i. To get this result in our model, assume that a fraction λ of the members of each religious group is considering conversion, where λ is determined as in our analysis.
Suppose that, among those considering conversion, the probability of each destination religion is proportional to the size of that religion. (To get Olson's conclusion, it is necessary that we include the incumbent religion, i, as a possible destination-conversion does not actually occur when this "destination" is chosen.) In this model, the turnover rate for religion i-the expected number who move out or in expressed as a ratio to the size of religion i-can be determined to be λ·(1-n i /n), where n i /n is the fraction of the population belonging to religion i. Hence, a smaller n i /n implies a higher turnover rate. religious adherence currently and when being raised, so that differences imply that at least one conversion occurred between childhood and the current age. The WVS asks whether a person ever had a different form of religious adherence, so that differences imply that at least one conversion took place before the current age. We cannot detect multiple conversions in these data.
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In addition to calculating changes of religion, we computed flows from some religion to none and no religion to some. However, these data pertain to overall 5 The General Social Survey (GSS) religion module for 1988 asked about multiple religious conversions in the United States. Among persons with at least one change (by the time of the survey), 67% indicated one change, 25% two, and 8% three or more.
These changes include movements into or out of no religion, as well as shifts within a major group, such as Protestantism.
religiousness and, therefore, to measures of religiosity of the forms considered in
McCleary and Barro (2006) and other cross-country studies. Our present empirical investigation relates not to changes in overall religiosity but rather to shifts of affiliation among persons professing some kind of religious adherence.
We focus on movements across major religious groups, rather than less drastic switches of denomination within a major category, such as between forms of
Protestantism (Greeley and Hout [1988] , Bibby and Brinkerhoff [1973 , 1983 , 1994 ). To get a consistent sample from the two waves of the ISSP and the one wave of the WVS, we aggregated the underlying types of religion to an eight-way classification: Catholic, Protestant, Muslim, Hindu, Eastern Religion (including Buddhist), Jewish, Orthodox, and
Other Religion.
The main difficulty in implementing the eight-way breakdown of religions involves the Other Religion category. Depending on the level of detail in each survey,
Other Religion includes different sets of residual groups. A particular concern is that, in some of the data, Other Religion includes independent Christian churches, which are likely to be largely evangelical, whereas in other data, most independent Christian churches are subsumed in the Protestant category. Since many religious changes in recent years involve movements into independent Christian churches (from Protestant and other religions), this distinction is important for obtaining consistent estimates of conversion rates across data sets. We address these concerns by constructing alternative measures of conversion rates based on different groupings of the underlying religions.
We also consider a seven-way breakdown that excludes the Other Religion category entirely in the computation of conversions. We find that our main results on the determinants of religious-conversion rates are robust to these alternative classifications.
The ISSP and WVS surveys indicate the current age of the respondent, among persons aged 16 and over. Previous research provides information on when in a life cycle religious conversion typically occurs. Iannaccone (1990, pp. 301-302) finds that, among converts into Catholicism in the United States, 85% converted before age 30. 6 The General Social Survey (GSS) religion module for 1988 indicates that, among persons with at least one change of religion, the breakdown of ages for a person's first change was 76% before age 30, 15% between 30 and 39, and 9% at 40 or over. 7 Need and de Graaf (1996, p. 93) find for the Netherlands that most people who leave the church act before age 30. However, this evidence applies to apostasy, not religious conversion.
The concentration of religious conversions at ages less than 30 is consistent with an important role for intermarriage in the conversion process, as emphasized by Lehrer (1998) and Sherkat (2004) . According to the GSS 1988 religion module for the United States, the reasons given for a person's first change of religion break down into 37% mentioning marriage or family, 25% friends or location, 18% issues of theology, and 19% with other reasons. Thus, intermarriage (part of the 37% group) is likely to be an 6 A difficulty with this statistic is that the surveys include persons of various agesconverts who were young when surveyed could not possibly have converted when old.
In addition, the conversion numbers include shifts from no religion.
important but not overriding element in religious conversion. The substantial role for friends and location (the 25% group) is also consistent with a concentration of religious conversions at young ages. That is, young people may convert along with switching jobs or changing social networks, both of which associate with moving to a new location.
To accord with observed patterns by age, we focus our empirical analysis on religious-conversion rates for persons aged 30 and over at the time of each survey. Thus, we concentrate on estimates of completed lifetime conversion rates. However, our results are similar for the broader group of persons aged 16 and over.
The total number of persons, T, surveyed in a given wave break down into those who, at an earlier time, adhered to various religions, R1, R2, …, and those expressing no religious adherence, N. For illustrative purposes, suppose that there are just two religions, so that
(1) T = R1 + R2 + N.
In comparing with current (survey-date) adherence, denoted by asterisks, nine transitions are possible: R1→R1*, R1→R2*, R1→N*, R2→R2*, R2→R1*, R2→N*, N→N*, N→R1*, and N→R2*. We view religious conversion as comprising R1→R2* and R2→R1*. We look at the total of these two changes and do not distinguish between them. The tables that we construct provide information on apostasy, R1→N* and R2→N*, and religious rebirth, N→R1* and N→R2*, but we do not study these transitions in our present statistical analysis.
Let ΔR be the sum of the two forms of religious conversion, R1→R2* and R2→R1*. The religious-conversion rate is the ratio of ΔR to the number of persons who began with some religious adherence, R1+R2:
(2) religious-conversion rate = ΔR/(R1 + R2).
Our analysis uses equation (2) to measure religious-conversion rates. However, we consider the eight categories of religion mentioned before, rather than two. Tables 1 and 2 describe the sample. The statistics pertain to respondents aged 30
and over for the countries in which the questions were asked that allow computation of religious-conversion rates. The wording of the WVS questions makes it difficult to fill-in all of the cells in the matrix in Table 2 . The notes to the table describe our procedures for estimating the numbers that cannot be computed directly from the WVS surveys.
Our cross-country analysis focuses on the country-wide religious-conversion rates shown by country and survey wave for persons aged 30 and over in columns 1-3 of We should stress that our empirical analysis uses only country averages of religious-conversion rates. This approach reflects our focus on country-level determinants of conversion, such as national policies and the country-level composition of religious adherence. For these purposes, we do not lose information by aggregating the conversion data to the country level. However, for other purposes-such as studying effects of gender, age, family structure, education, income, the local composition of religious adherence, and so on-it would be beneficial to include within-country variations at the individual level. One difficulty is that the data from ISSP and WVS on some of the individual variables, such as income and education, are of low quality. In addition, measuring the local composition of religious adherence and matching these data to the individual observations from ISSP and WVS is probably impossible.
III. Setup of the Empirical Analysis
We use a regression system with three equations. The dependent variables are the logs of religious-conversion rates from ISSP 1991 , ISSP 1998 , and WVS 2001 in Table 3 . 9 The estimates allow the error variances to differ for the three samples and 9 The log form appropriately restricts the conversion rate to non-negative values. (No zero values occur in our main sample but do arise in several cases when we exclude
Other Religion in the calculation of conversion rates. For the regressions with this alternative religious-conversion rate, we used the log of the conversion rate plus 0.001.)
We could use a logistic form, log[x/(1-x)], where x is the conversion rate, to restrict the conversion rate not to exceed one. However, since all observed values of x are much less than one, the logistic form is nearly the same as the simpler log form that we use.
for the residuals to be correlated across survey waves for a given country. 10 Each equation has its own intercept, thereby allowing for differences across surveys in measured levels of conversion rates. Aside from the different intercepts, the coefficients of the explanatory variables are constrained to be the same across the three survey waves.
The dependent variables apply at the country level, with each country entering between one and three times. The system does not include fixed effects for countries.
The primary reason is that most of the variations in religious-conversion rates (as well as the explanatory variables) are cross-sectional-country fixed effects would eliminate almost all of the information. Table 4 shows means and standard deviations for the variables used in the regressions. The first three columns are for the regression samples, dictated mainly by availability of religious-conversion data, and the last three columns apply to broader samples. All means apply to unweighted samples; that is, each country receives the same weight irrespective of population, GDP, and so on.
The independent variables correspond to the hypotheses from the theoretical framework described before. The religious-pluralism variable is based on a breakdown of religious adherence for 1970 from Barrett, Kurian, and Johnson (2001) ; henceforth, referred to as Barrett. We use an eight-way breakdown of religions, corresponding to the 10 We use the seemingly-unrelated or SUR estimation technique. See Wooldridge (2002, Ch. 7).
one used for the ISSP and WVS surveys. 11 Barrett also provides information on the fraction of the population having no religious adherence.
The form of the pluralism variable is suggested by a matching model, applied as an example to marriage between persons with different religions. The variable corresponds to the probability that a randomly selected person with some religious adherence will, in a random encounter, meet a person with some, but different, religious
adherence. The first concept we use is one minus the usual Herfindahl index of religiousadherence shares among persons with some adherence. This measure-the sum of the squares of the religion-adherence shares-is appropriate if persons with some religion randomly encounter other persons with some, but possibly different, religion.
We also consider an alternative pluralism measure that takes account of persons with no religion. This measure applies if people with some religion randomly encounter other persons with some religion (the same or different) or no religion. Given the distribution across types of religion, the second variable is smaller than the first if the share of the population with no religion is positive (see the notes to Table 3 ).
If we allow for assortative mating-persons of the same religion being more likely to match-the probability of a religious mismatch could be substantially smaller than the number given by either of the religious-pluralism variables. However, the Table 4 makes clear some of the selection issues related to the availability of the religious-conversion data. The regression sample for religious conversion comprises countries that are substantially richer and better educated than the broad sample of countries. The regression sample is over-weighted toward former Communist countries.
In terms of religious adherence, the regression sample is slanted toward Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, and Jewish, and away from Muslim, Hindu, Eastern Religion (including Buddhist), and Other Religion. The regression sample also has overrepresentation of persons with no religion.
We lack instruments to establish firmly causation from the explanatory variables to the religious-conversion rates. 15 We think that the main concern is the restrictions-onconversion variable, which is likely to be simultaneously determined (from a politicaleconomy standpoint) with the conversion rate. Since we lack plausible instruments for the restrictions variable (and also have no time-series variations in this variable within countries), we consider how the deletion of this variable affects the other results. For the religious-pluralism variable, we find that instrumenting the 1970 variable with values from 1900 has little effect on the estimates. As expected, the religious-pluralism variable for 1970 (calculated from adherence shares among the adhering population) has a significantly positive effect on the log of the religious-conversion rate; the coefficient in Table 5 , column 1 is 2.9 (s.e. = 0.5). This coefficient means, if interpreted causally, that a one-standard-deviation increase in the religious-pluralism variable (by 0.19 in Table 4 ) raises the estimated log of the conversion rate by 0.55. That is, at the sample mean conversion rate of 0.050 (for ISSP 1998), the estimated conversion rate would rise by about 70% to 0.087. Looking at If we re-estimate the system using the 1900 value of the religious-pluralism variable as an instrument, the results change little. The estimated coefficient on the pluralism variable becomes 2.57 (s.e. = 0.52), and the other coefficients change little from those shown in Table 5 , column 1. This result provides some support for a causal interpretation of our results; that is, religious pluralism affecting religious conversion, rather than the reverse.
IV. Empirical Findings
If we add the change in the religious-pluralism variable from 1900 to 1970 to the regression system in Table 5 , column 1, this new variable has an estimated coefficient near zero. We think this result applies because the measured change in pluralism is too far in the past to matter for our measured religious-conversion rates. Thus, our results pertain to the long-term relation between the structure of religious adherence and religious-conversion rates, not to effects from changes in the adherence structure.
As expected, legal restrictions that deter religious conversion (involving proselytizing and inter-faith marriage) have a significantly negative relation with the log of the conversion rate, with a coefficient in Table 5 , column 1 of -0.84 (s.e. = 0.21). The estimated coefficient implies, if interpreted causally, that the implementation of a legal restriction (moving the dummy variable from zero to one) reduces the estimated conversion rate by nearly 60%-from 0.05 to 0.02 at the sample mean for ISSP 1998.
The conversion restrictions that we recorded apply to 25% of the regression sample (see Tables 3 and 4) . As noted before, the sample contains no predominantly Muslim countries, many of which have legal restrictions on religious conversion.
Religious conversion is significantly negatively related to former Communism, with a coefficient in Table 5 , column 1 of -1.52 (s.e. = 0.20). The regression sample has 35% of the observations as former Communist (Table 4) . Previous findings (McCleary and Barro [2006] ) indicated that the influence of past Communism on religious participation and belief decayed over time but continued to be significantly negative after 10-15 years. (See also Inglehart and Baker [2000] .) Our interpretation is that past
Communism has a depressing influence on the value attached currently to formal religion and, thereby, diminishes the propensity for religious conversion.
The log of real per capita GDP in 1990 has a negative but small and statistically insignificant relation with religious-conversion rates. The estimated coefficient in Table 5 , column 1 is -0.09 (s.e. = 0.19). This result accords with the ambiguous effect noted before for the effect of per capita income on the value attached to formal religion.
The average years of school attainment of the adult population in 1990 has a significantly positive coefficient: 0.21 (s.e. = 0.05). 16 This coefficient implies that a onestandard-deviation increase in educational attainment (by 1.6 years in the regression sample, see Table 4 ) raises the estimated religious-conversion rate by about 40% (from 0.05 to 0.07 at the sample mean for ISSP 1998). Our interpretation is that more education reduces the cost of religious conversion and raises the benefit from formal religion-thereby, raising the propensity to convert on both counts.
Although per capita GDP and education are highly positively correlated, the results show that the sample has sufficient independent movement in these variables to distinguish the effects. The estimated positive impact of education on a country's religious-conversion rate accords with Loveland (2003, Table 2 ), who found a significantly positive effect from years of education on the probability of switching 16 If we break down total years of schooling into primary, secondary, and higher, the estimated coefficients are 0.19 (s.e. = 0.08) on primary, 0.23 (0.12) on secondary, and 0.28 (0.39) on higher. These results accord with the hypothesis that only total years of schooling matter (p-value = 0.92).
religions in the United States in the 1988 GSS religion module. However, this research is not directly comparable to ours, because Loveland's definition of religious switching includes movements from some to no religion and vice versa. Lehrer (1998, p. 255) and Sherkat (2004, p. 618) report positive effects of education on individual probabilities of intermarriage in the United States. Through this channel, an increase in education is likely to stimulate religious conversion, particularly for women (Sherkat [2004, p. 620] ).
Our results are not very different if we use the alternative definition of religious pluralism-the one discussed before that brings in an effect from the no-religion share.
These results are in Table 6 , column 1. The pattern of estimated coefficients is similar to that in Table 5 , column 1, but the fits are somewhat poorer. We focus, henceforth, on the findings with the initial form of the pluralism variable. Table 5 , column 2 adds to the regression system two dummy variables concerning institutional aspects of religion-the existence of a state religion in 1970 and the presence of government regulation of religion in the 1970s. Although these variables were important in an earlier study for explaining religious participation and beliefs (McCleary and Barro [2006] ), the two variables are individually and jointly statistically insignificant in the system for religious conversion (p-value = 0.20 for joint significance). This result makes sense because the regression system already includes a more directly relevant institutional measure, the presence of legal restrictions related to conversion.
We next added measures of religious participation and beliefs (applying typically around 1990). Conceptually, the effects of these variables on religious conversion are ambiguous. Greater participation and belief signify that formal religion is more important to a person, thereby suggesting a higher frequency of religious conversion.
However, greater participation and belief also indicate a higher degree of satisfaction with and attachment to a person's incumbent religion and, thereby, predict a lower frequency of religious conversion. In any event, the estimated coefficients are insignificant when we use the extent of monthly or more attendance at formal religious services along with the extent of belief in hell, heaven, or an after-life, or whether people view themselves as religious. (Some of these variables were statistically significant for explaining economic growth in Barro and McCleary [2003] .) A representative finding appears in Table 5 , column 3, which includes monthly attendance along with the extent of religiousness. The p-value for joint significance of these two variables is 0.70.
We also consider whether religious-conversion rates bear some relation to the composition of religious adherence (in 1970). Effects might arise here if religions differ by costs of joining or leaving or by degree of attachment of members. Among the categories of religion shown in Table 4 , the only one that has significant explanatory power for religious-conversion rates is the Muslim share of the adhering population. Table 5 , column 4 shows a marginally significant negative effect from the Muslim adherence share. The inclusion of this variable has little impact on the other results, except that the coefficient on the conversion-restrictions variable becomes smaller in magnitude (but remains statistically significant).
V. Specification Issues and Robustness
One concern is that the estimated regression coefficients can be biased if one or more of the explanatory variables are jointly determined with religious-conversion rates.
As an example, when citizens have a greater propensity to switch religions, governments may react by changing policy toward religious conversion, thereby making the restrictions-on-conversion variable endogenous.
We have not been successful in finding plausibly exogenous instruments for the restrictions-on-conversion variable. However, one can get a sense of the potential bias on the other estimated coefficients by examining the impact of removing the restrictions variable from the system. When we drop this variable from Table 5 , Column 1, we find little change in the magnitude or statistical significance of the other estimated coefficients. This result suggests that the potential bias in the other estimated coefficients may be small.
We have also investigated the robustness of our results to alternative definitions of religious conversion. As noted before, we use alternative approaches concerning the treatments of the categories Protestant and Other Religion in the computation of religious-conversion rates. Table 6 , column 2 corresponds to an alternative definition in which all persons labeled Other Christian are classified as Protestant, rather than Other
Religion. This change has little impact for most countries but does matter substantially for Sweden, Norway, and New Zealand. The overall pattern of estimated coefficients is similar to that in the original specification (Table 5 , column 1). The main change is the reduction in the coefficient for school attainment. The fits are also poorer than those in the initial specification. Thus, our preference is for the original specification, but the main inferences are robust to this change in the definition of conversion. Table 6 , column 3 corresponds to a second alternative definition, which eliminates all conversions associated with Other Religion. This alternative constitutes a more substantial change because the religious-conversion rates are roughly halved.
However, the computed conversion rates are still highly correlated with the original values. The regression coefficients show more differences from the original form (Table 5 , column 1), but religious pluralism and school attainment remain significantly positive and Communism remains significantly negative. Two differences are that the conversion-restrictions variable is no longer statistically significant, and the log of per capita GDP becomes significantly negative. The fits of the equations-particularly for the ISSP waves-are notably poorer than those for the original specification. Thus, we prefer the original specification but nevertheless find it reassuring that the overall pattern of results is robust to this drastic change in definition of religious conversion.
VI. Summary Observations
Before speculating on broader implications of our results, we provide a brief summary of the major findings. We used retrospective questions about religious adherence from three international survey waves to construct country averages of religious-conversion rates. Our concept of conversion considers only shifts across major types of religion, using a breakdown of religions into eight broad groups. The conversion rates for the population aged 30 and over vary substantially across countries, ranging from near zero for Spain, Italy, and many former Communist countries in Eastern Europe to over 10% in the United States, Canada, Chile, and New Zealand.
In a theoretical model, the frequency of religious conversion depends on costs of switching and costs of having the "wrong" religion. This model suggested explanatory variables to use in our empirical analysis of country-level religious-conversion rates.
Several findings accord with the underlying theory: the religious-conversion rate is positively related to the extent of religious pluralism, gauged by the composition of adherence shares; negatively related to government restrictions that inhibit religious conversion; positively related to levels of education; and negatively related to a history of Communism. Given these variables, conversion rates were not much related to real per capita GDP, the presence of state religion or state regulation of religion, and the extent of religious participation and beliefs. The composition of religious adherence was mostly unimportant, except for a small negative effect from the Muslim adherence share.
A broader interpretation of our results starts with a view of religious conversion as one dimension of the fluidity of the religion market. Greater ease of conversion increases religious-convergence rates and leads, thereby, to a better long-run match between actual and ideal forms of religious adherence. This better match predicts, in turn, an increase in religious participation and beliefs.
In many cases, the improved matching would also raise the degree of religious pluralism and, hence, the extent of competition among providers of religious services.
The religion-market model developed by Bainbridge (1987), Iannaccone (1991) , and Finke and Stark (1992) predicts that the heightened competition and the resulting improvements in service quality would raise levels of religiosity. Hence, the predictions about religiosity in the religion-market model reinforce the effects from the improved matching between actual and ideal forms of religion. Finally, to the extent that enhanced religiosity appears as more intense religious beliefs related to an after-life, the results of Barro and McCleary (2003) predict favorable effects on economic growth.
Before we jump too far down this path, we should note that our empirical results do not detect any statistically significant relation between religious-conversion rates and the extent of religious participation or beliefs (exemplified by the results in Table 5 , column 3). That is, holding fixed the independent variables that we considered, there is no remaining (partial) relationship between religious-conversion rates and religiosity.
This lack of association may arise because differences in conversion rates do not derive mainly from supply-side factors, such as differences in government regulations that influence the cost of switching between religions. For example, conversion rates would be low if most people were satisfied with (or at least committed to) their incumbent religions-through this channel, a healthier religion environment would tend to correlate with lower rates of religious conversion.
The broader lesson is that a full sorting out of the interplay between religious conversion and the vibrancy of the religion market requires consideration of the underlying supply and demand factors that determine the rates of religious conversion.
We think that our cross-country empirical evidence provides a good start in isolating these underlying factors. questions first ask whether the respondent is currently a member of a religious denomination and, if so, which. Current members of a religious denomination were asked whether they were ever a member of a different religious denomination-and, if so, which. These questions allow us to match current and former denominations for people with two different denominations. However, we cannot tell whether persons with a current but no former (and different) denomination were previously in the same denomination or had no religion. To fill in the affected cells, indicated by asterisks, we first estimated the total number of persons with no religious adherence during the various prior years applicable to the WVS questions. We estimated these values by using non-religion fractions from the Barrett values, by 0.12 on average. We therefore added 0.12 to the Barrett non-religion shares for 1970 to estimate the WVS nonreligion fractions for the earlier dates. The final assumption needed to fill in the missing cells is that the ratio of persons coming from the same denomination to those coming from no religion was the same for each current denomination. of 40 countries comprises those, aside from East Germany (which is missing other data), with religious-conversion data. Means are unweighted averages across the countries.
The religious-adherence shares are fractions of the adhering population in each country.
Sources: Religious-conversion rates, shown in Table 3 , are from ISSP 1991, ISSP 1998, and WVS 2001. Religious-adherence shares among the adhering population and nonreligion fractions are from Barrett, Kurian, and Johnson (2001) . Pluralism indicators are calculated from these shares, as described in the notes to Table 3 and the text. The dummy variable for restrictions on religious conversion (restrictions on proselytizing or inter-faith marriage) is from Fox and Sandler (2008) . Real per capita GDP is from PennWorld Tables version 6.2 (available online). School attainment is from Barro and Lee (2001) . Dummy variables for Communism, state religion, and regulation of religion are from Barro and McCleary (2005) . Church-attendance rates (for monthly or greater attendance) and frequencies of religious beliefs and religiousness are from various waves of ISSP, WVS, and the Gallup Millennium Survey (see the text). Table 3 , columns 1-3. The religious-pluralism variable is in Table 3 , column 4. Notes: Column 1 differs from Table 5 , column 1, in the definition of the religiouspluralism variable as the one in Table 3 , column 5, rather than column 4. Column 2 differs from Table 5 , column 1, in the change of the dependent variable to calculate religious-conversion rates by treating all Other Christian as Protestant, rather than Other Religion. Column 3 differs from Table 5 , column 1, in the change of the dependent variable to calculate religious-conversion rates by omitting all conversions involving Other Religion.
